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Privacy-preserving Trust Establishment scheme for
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Antonis Michalas, Vladimir A. Oleshchuk, Nikos Komninos, and Neeli R Prasad
Abstract—This paper proposes a decentralized trust establish-
ment protocol for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), where
nodes establish security associations. In order to achieve privacy
and security, we use homomorphic encryption and polynomial
intersection so as to find the intersection of two sets. The first
set represents a list of recommenders of the initiator and the
second set is a list of trusted recommenders of the responder. The
intersection of the sets represents a list of nodes that recommend
the first node and their recommendations are trusted by the
second node. In our experimental results we show that our
scheme is effective even if there are 30 trusted nodes.
Index Terms—Trust, Homomorphic Encryption, Reputation
System, Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE past few years’ computers started becoming more andmore important for our daily round, until they became
an inextricable part of our lives. As a result, users started to
set also new demands for connectivity. Wired solutions were
just not enough, since there was an increasing request on for
connecting to the Internet, reading and sending E-mails and
changing information from anywhere in general. The solution
to that wish is offered by the so called ad-hoc networks.
Unlike common wireless networks, ad-hoc networks are
characterized by the absence of any existing network infras-
tructure or centralized administration (decentralized wireless
network) as well as the ease and speed of deployment. Such
networks are highly dynamic and each node participates in
the basic functions of the network like packet forwarding and
routing, since there are no routers or access points. Ad-hoc
networks can operate in a stand-alone way or be attached to
a larger network.
The decentralized nature of ad-hoc networks makes them
appropriate for a variety of applications where infrastructures
that support central nodes are not suitable, and may expand the
scalability compared to typical wireless networks. In addition,
ad-hoc networks are suitable for situations where there is
lack of an infrastructure. An ad hoc application is a self-
organized application composed of mobile and autonomous
devices interacting as peers, whose connections are made
possible because of fairly close distances.
Applications of ad-hoc networks range from military tactical
operations, to crisis management services, such as in disaster
recovery, where the whole communication infrastructure is
ruined and resorting communication rapidly is critical as
well as data gathering from sensor networks, or even instant
messaging/meeting applications.
A. Our Contribution
In this paper we present a scheme for trust-based
communication between nodes of an ad-hoc network. In order
to do so, we use a reputation system that each node takes
into consideration before it decides to serve another node of
the network. The proposed trust establishment scheme does
not use any central trust authority, since this a superfluous
requirement for ad-hoc networks. Apart from that, we make
use of Homomorphic Encryption so as to achieve better
security and privacy for our model. In addition, possible
malicious nodes will be responsible for making the most
expensive computations in order to acquire some of the
resources of another node in the network.
Following this introduction, the paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2 we briefly discuss about different
attacks on ad-hoc networks, in Section 3 we analyze why
a Trusted model is important for the secure function of a
network, in Section 4 we examine related works that have
been made in order to secure ad-hoc networks with the use of
a Trusted Model. In Section 5 we describe our new technique,
that combines Homomorphic Encryption with a Reputation
System so as to achieve better security in an ad-hoc network,
while in Section 6 we briefly discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of our technique. In Section 7 we present our
experimental results and we conclude the paper in Section 8.
II. ATTACKS IN AD-HOC NETWORKS
Ad-Hoc Networks and more precisely Mobile Ad-Hoc Net-
works (MANETs) have inherently different properties than
traditional wired networks and thus new kind of vulnerabil-
ities/attacks have been arise. In this section we are going to
briefly describe different types of attacks in order so as to have
a picture why it is important to secure MANETs.
In such networks we find two different types of attacks, pas-
sive and active. In passive attacks, the attacker tries to collect
important information about the network by eavesdropping the
routing traffic. By doing that, the attacker can be in position
for example to understand which nodes are playing the most
crucial role in a network, and try to compromise them in order
to bring the whole network down. In general passive attacks
do not interfere with the stored data and there are very difficult
to detect since the attacked entity is unaware of the attack.
In active attacks the attacker has to spend some of his
resources so as to successfully change the content of a packet
or to just disrupt other nodes of the network. This kind of
TABLE I
ATTACK CATEGORIES
Passive Active
Traffic Analysis Denial of Service
Passive Eavedropping Man in the Middle Attack
Unauthorized Access
Replay Attack
Session Highjacking
attacks can result to several losses for the nodes of the network.
In Table I a list of both passive and active attacks are presented.
III. TRUST
Security and Trust are two notions that are strongly con-
nected to each other. Theses two notions are overlapping but
not coinciding. An entity (node) can be trusted, if operates ex-
actly as designed and expected and works without disruption.
In order to understand the term ”trust an entity”, we firstly
differentiate two significant notions of ”target of trust” and its
”classification”. ”Target of trust” is the actual entity we trust,
while the ”classification” defines precisely why the entity is
being trusted for. Furthermore, there might be a value of trust
which describes how much we trust an entity according to
some criteria [2].
Third-Party Trust refers to a situation in which two nodes
trust each other even though they have not previously ex-
changed packets or established any kind of communication. In
such a situation, these nodes can trust each other if and only if
they have a relationship with another node in the network that
they trust, and that node guarantees for the trustworthiness of
the other node. Direct Trust is when two nodes have already
established a trusting relationship and they can communicate
to each other immediately (at least for a specific period of
time), without the need of a third-party.
In wired networks is much easier to create dominant Trust
Management Systems since nodes in do not have limita-
tions such as energy consumption or limited computational
resources. Furthermore, the topology of wired networks is
not changing dynamically as in ad-hoc networks. So, Trust
Establishment in ad-hoc networks it still remains an open
issue.
IV. RELATED WORK
Trust establishment is concerning scientists for many years
and lot of schemes have been developed to address that issue,
not only in wired but also in wireless ad-hoc networks. We can
distinguish the different approaches into two categories. Those
who use a central authority and those who use a self-organized
approach.
J. Sen et al in [3] presented a trust establishment scheme
for ad hoc networks based on distributed trust model. A
trust initiator was introduced only in the system-bootstrapping
phase to initiate the protocol. A fully self-organized trust es-
tablishment approach was then adopted to handle the dynamic
topology of the network and the membership changes of the
nodes, while ensuring trust establishment among the nodes
with shorter trust chains and very high probability.
Fig. 1. Small scale ad hoc network.
C. Papageorgiou et al in [4] proposed a dynamic trust
establishment protocol that allowed nodes of an ad hoc net-
work to establish security associations among each other in a
distributed and peer-to-peer manner. The basis of the protocol
was a node-to-node security handshake using a network-wide
key that every node was preconfigured with.
A.A. Pirzadapresent and C. McDonald, in [1] presented
a model for trust-based communication in ad-hoc networks
which introduced the notion of belief and provide a dynamic
measure of reliability and trustworthiness in an ad-hoc net-
work.
A. Josang in [5] showed that authentication can not be based
only on public key certificates, but also needs to include the
binding between the key used for certification and its owner,
as well as the trust relationships between users. Furthermore,
he developed a simple algebra scheme and described how it
can be used to compute measures of authenticity.
M. Raya et al in [6] argued that the traditional notion of trust
as a relation among entities, becomes insufficient for emerging
data-centric mobile ad hoc networks and they proposed a new
framework for data-centric trust establishment.
V. OUR TRUST MODEL
The proposed Trust Model does not based on any central
Trust Authority, instead every node of the network, is re-
sponsible to recognize if the node who is making a request
is Trustful, Malicious or there is no information about its
behavior (Uncertainty level).
If we consider the example of Figure 1, where node1 wants
to communicate with node2, then node2 is the one who has
to find if it can trust node1 or not. In order to do so, when
node2 receives the request, must first check if it has any
information about this node from a previous communication.
If the answer is ”yes” then it simply checks the trust level
that has been assigned to node1. In general we recognize the
following cases:
• Trustful then node2 serves the request.
• Malicious it sends a computational problem to node1,
and wait for a time interval t (for example t ≤ 10sec) for
node1 to solve it. If node1 solves the problem correct and
within the time interval t then node2 serves the request,
otherwise drops the connection.
• Uncertainty, which means that they had never had a
communication in the past, node2 asks from node1 to
send which of the nodes in the network can give a
recommendation for node1.
So, if for example node3, node4 and node5 had established
a connection (trustful relationships) in the past with node1,
node1 would respond to node2 by sending a set with the id’s of
these nodes. Then if node2 has previously established trustful
relationships with any of these nodes (node3, node4 or node5)
it can ask them to give their opinion about node1. In all cases,
the total level of trust for node1 will have to be Trustful, so
as to be served immediately (i.e node3 → Trust, node4 →
Malicious, node5 → Trust). In any other case, we use the
options we described later in this section.
A problem that arise here is the fact that it is not secure
to expose list of trusted nodes and their recommendations.
It could be used by an attacker to collect information about
node’s trustful relations and also to create some privacy issues.
Hence, we use homomorphic encryption to force the commu-
nication initiator to spend more computational resources than
the one who is receiving the request.
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption that
permits performance of a specific algebraic operation (denoted
by ⊗) on the plain text by performing a (possibly different)
algebraic operation (denoted by ⊕) on the corresponding ci-
phertext. The homomorphic cryptosystems are used as a basic
building block in many secure multiparty protocols. Several
such cryptosystems have been proposed in the literature [8],
[9]. More formally, let us consider a public-key cryptosys-
tem with the homomorphic property where encryption and
decryption are denoted as E(.) and D(.) respectively. It means
that there is an operation on encrypted data, denoted as ⊕,
that can be used to perform summation on the encrypted data
without decrypting them. Thus, we can find the encrypted sum
of encrypted x and y; that is, E(x) ⊕ E(y) = E(x ⊗ y).
Consequently, we are able to multiply encrypted data if
only one of the multipliers is unencrypted. Homomorphic
cryptosystems proposed in the literature define operation ⊗
as modular multiplication while ⊕ is defined as modular
addition or XOR. As a simple example of a homomorphic
cryptosystem, we can consider the RSA cryptosystem. It is
easy to see that E(x1) ⊕ E(x2) = (xe1modn)(xe2modn) =
xe1x
e
2modn = (x1x2)
emodn = E(x1 ⊕ x2), where (e, n)
is a public key. In this case, both ⊕ and ⊗ are modular
multiplications. However, in the context of secure multi-party
computations, the most used cryptosystems define ⊗ as a
modular addition [8], [9].
Our solution is based on proposed in [7] approach to find
privacy preserving intersection of two sets. Assuming that the
first set represents a list of recommenders of node1 and the
second set is a list of trusted recommenders of node2. Then the
intersection will represent a list of nodes that can recommend
the first node and their recommendations are trusted by the
second node.
A. Construction of the Polynomial
In order to find the intersection of two sets, we use the
method that Freedman et al proposed in [7].
We assume that each node has selected public and pri-
vate keys according to some homomorphic public-key crypto
scheme. Let Eni(m) denote an encryption of m with public
key of node ni, and Dni(m) denote a decryption of m
with private key of node ni. We assume that Eni(x + y) =
Eni(x)⊕ Eni(y).
Lets assume that node1 has k nodes that can recommend
it. So the set with the recommenders of node1 is defined as
follows:
R1 = {n3, · · · , nk+2} (1)
Because, we don’t want to expose the content of R1 to
possible passive attacker(s) that may intercept the message(s)
and to the receiver (node2), we construct polynomial P of
degree k from the set R1, such that the roots of P will be the
elements of R1. As we can see from (2) the roots of P are
the elements of set R1.
P (x) = (n3 − x) · (n4 − x) · · · (nk+2 − x) (2)
⇒ P (x) =
k∑
i=0
ai · xi (3)
After node1 has defined polynomial P (x), it encrypts
the coefficients with its public key and sends to node2 the
encrypted coefficients of this polynomial. Node2 receives a
set of the encrypted coefficients (4):
En1(R1) = {En1(ak), En1(ak−1), · · · , En1(a0)} (4)
Similarly, we suppose that node2 have l nodes that it trusts,
represented by set R2:
R2 = {nk+2, nk+3, · · · , nk+l+1} (5)
The two nodes have to find the intersection of sets R1 and
R2, in order to know which ’friends’ they have in common.
But this cannot be found from node2 (at least not without
spending lot of computational resources) since the list it re-
ceived is encrypted. So node2 makes use of the homomorphic
encryption properties, to calculate encrypted values of P (x)
for each x from R2 without knowing coefficients of P (x) in
clear text or result of calculation.
That is, for each node nj from R2, node2 can calculate
polynomial without decrypting coefficients as follows:
En1(P1(nj)) = En1(ak)n
k
j ⊕ · · · ⊕ En1(a1)nj ⊕ En1(a0)
So, node2 creates the following set:
En1(R2) = {En1(P (nk+2)), · · · , En1(P (nk+l+1))}
En1(R2) is sent back to node1 who has to decrypt it in
order to find if the two sets intersects (P (x) = 0 for at least
one element x from R2)
In our case it’s clear that:
R1 ∩R2 = nk+2, (6)
which means that the only common ’friend’ they have is
nk+2. So, node1 will find its common friends with node2
(in our example only node nk+2) and it will ask them to
give their reputation opinion about node2. Since node1 is
communicating with with node(s) that have previously estab-
lished a trustful relationship, the cost of the communication
is significantly small. The same also holds for the next step
where these nodes will communicate with node2 in order to
give their reputation for node1.
VI. SECURITY DISCUSSION
Reputation adjustment is a very crucial issue in trust estab-
lishment. There should be a standard way known to all nodes
so as to facilitate the assignment of the reputation values for
different kind of activities. In our approach, we have only three
levels of reputation (Trustful, Malicious and Uncertainty) and
we do not use scoring like many other techniques. However
more advanced techniques proposed in literature can be used
here. Apart from that, in order to compete with situations
where trusted nodes have been compromised, we make use
of a time trust interval tTrust. If a node is considered to be
trusted and initiates a connection after tTrust passed, then
its reputation level is considered as Neutral. This technique
provides security in two different directions. First we make
use of the concept that if someone is trusted ”today”, it does
not mean that he should be also trusted ”tomorrow”. The
second issue that we solve overcomes a security flaw that
exists in many systems with reputation scoring. If we use
a score for each known node, then an attacker could either
compromise a sufficient number of nodes with very high scores
or alternately could actively participate in the network for a
period of time for the purpose of gaining reputation points.
These two methods could lead to powerful attacks, as each
node’s reputation will take time to decrease, allowing the
attacker to operate with impunity for a longer period of time
before he is labeled as malicious.
In addition to three tier scoring, we propose a security
system based on social networks approaches with a feedback
structure. Initial communication between nodes will be de-
termined according to mutually established ”friends” on the
network as well as the requesting node’s feedback by these
friends. To facilitate secure communication of information
about other members of the network (the ”friends”), we use
homomorphic based encryption scheme. In this method, the
requesting node sends an encrypted list of its friends to the
target node. The target node, in turn, adds its own list of friends
to the encrypted message and sends it back. The properties
of homomorphic encryption ensure that this stage requires
negligible resources from the target node. Having received
the encrypted combined lists of friends, the initiating node
checks the lists to find any mutual friends. Having found
mutual friends, that node proceeds to communicate with them,
requesting that they in turn verify to the target node that it
is to be trusted. That all nodes involved in this procedure are
trusted friends ensures a quick resolution of the security check.
If the initiating node did not find any mutual friends in the
Fig. 2. Total time for two nodes to find their common friends.
lists, it informs the target node about it, resulting in the usual
communication between neutral nodes.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we describe the implementation of the
proposed Trust Establishment scheme.
In order to measure the effectiveness of our solution, we
have used the Smart Dust simulator written in Java. Our
testbed consists of a laptop computer with Intel Core Duo
CPU P7450 at 2.13GHz, 6.00 GB of RAM running Windows 7
64-bit. For the purpose of our experiments, we constructed
an instance of the Paillier’s cryptosystem with 512 bits of
modulus. Our experiments were implemented in a medium
scale ad hoc network as seen in Figure 1. When nodes wish to
communicate with their neighbors, they broadcast a message,
which is processed by the neighboring nodes.
In our experiment we first of all measured the total time
needed for the encryption, decryption as well as the intersec-
tion of the polynomials in order to find the common friends.
The results of this experiment can be found in Figure 2. Fur-
thermore, Table II shows some representative results from this
experiment. As we can see, in the case where the polynomial
is of degree 5 (which means that it has 5 friends) the time
until node1 finds the common friends with node2 is 0.78sec,
while in the extreme case where the degree of the polynomial
is 30 the time is 4.92sec which is also an affordable time even
for devices like PDA’s and mobile phones.
TABLE II
RESULTS FROM FIGURE 2
Friends Time (sec)
5 0.78
10 1.64
15 2.50
20 3.71
25 4.29
30 4.92
In our next experiment we measured the time that node2
(the node who is receiving a request) has to spend in order
to add its friends to the encrypted list of node′s1 friends that
received. The results are presented in Figure 3 while Table III
Fig. 3. Total time for node2 to add its friends to the encrypted list of node1.
shows some representative results from this experiment. From
these results we can see that the time node2 spends in order
to share its friends list with node1 is significant small, since
even for the case where the polynomial is of degree 30 the
time that node2 spends is much less than 1sec. This means
that each node that receives a request is spending very little of
its resources while it is also protected from possible attacks.
TABLE III
RESULTS FROM FIGURE 3
Friends Time (sec)
5 0.000296418
10 0.00063518
15 0.000982122
20 0.001692848
25 0.001897043
30 0.002251126
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a robust Trust Establish-
ment scheme for securing mobile ad hoc networks. Our
scheme make use of public-key cryptography in order to
protect/enhance privacy between nodes. Furthermore, it forces
possible malicious nodes to spend some of their resources,
so as to prove that they wish to be served as well as to
improve their reputation in the network. In order to do that,
we use homomorphic encryption and polynomial intersection,
which provide each node with a higher level of security,
since they do not exchange sensitive information in plain text.
Our approach, aims at building confidence measures regarding
route trustworthiness in nodes that are dynamically computed
and modified based on effort - computational resources each
node spends and passively observed by reputation from other
nodes in the network.
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